Putnam's brain-in-a-vat argument uses semantic externalism to claim that a envatted brain could not meaningfully express the thought that it is a brain in a vat. The skeptical scenario thus undermines itself.
Words get their reference through causal links to the world, so a permanently envatted being's statement about vats would not refer to real vats, making the skeptical claim self-refuting.
Source: Reason, Truth and History
Putnam argued against metaphysical realism, the view that there is one ready-made world independent of all conceptual schemes. His internal realism holds that what counts as an object depends on the conceptual framework we adopt, though not arbitrarily.
There is no single description of the world that is independent of every perspective; what exists is relative to a conceptual scheme, yet it is not therefore a matter of mere whim.
Source: Reason, Truth and History
Putnam argued that mental states are defined by their functional roles, not by the material that realizes them. Since the same mental state could be realized in differently built systems, mind is not strictly identical to the brain.
Pain is whatever plays the pain role in a system, so octopuses, humans, or machines might share mental states despite different physical substrates.
Source: Psychological Predicates