Hylomorphism
Aristotle treated the soul as the form of a living body rather than a separate substance. Mind-related capacities are the organized activities of a living organism, though he gave the intellect a special, puzzling status.
Mind is not a thing alongside the body but the way a living body is organized and active; separating them is like separating the shape of a wax seal from the wax.
Source: De Anima
Substance dualism
Descartes argued that mind is a thinking, non-extended substance distinct from the extended body, including the brain. He held that they interact, famously locating the interface in the pineal gland.
Because I can doubt that my body exists but not that I am thinking, the mind must be a different kind of thing from any physical organ.
Source: Meditations on First Philosophy
Monism / dual-aspect
Spinoza rejected interaction between two substances, holding that mind and body are one reality understood under two attributes, thought and extension. They are not identical as descriptions, yet they are not separate things.
The order of ideas and the order of bodily events are the same underlying order seen in two ways, so mind and body neither cause nor exist apart from each other.
Source: Ethics
Rationalism
Leibniz argued that perception cannot be explained by mechanical parts alone. Using the image of walking inside a brain-sized mill, he claimed one would find only gears pushing each other, never an experience.
No arrangement of moving physical parts, however intricate, would reveal a perception, so the mind cannot simply be a machine-like brain.
Source: Monadology
Analytic / ordinary language philosophy
Ryle criticized the Cartesian picture as a category mistake, a ghost in the machine. For him, mental terms describe dispositions and patterns of behavior, not an inner object, whether immaterial or neural.
Asking where the mind sits in addition to the body misuses language; minds are ways people behave and are disposed to behave.
Source: The Concept of Mind
Type identity theory
Smart, with U. T. Place, defended the view that sensations are identical with brain processes, as lightning is identical with electrical discharge. The identity is a contingent scientific discovery, not a conceptual truth.
Mental states turn out to be brain processes, just as water turned out to be H2O, and the apparent gap is a matter of different vocabularies.
Source: Sensations and Brain Processes