Dennett argues that consciousness is a set of information-processing capacities rather than a mysterious inner glow. He sees no principled barrier to artificial minds, while doubting that the intuitive picture of consciousness survives scrutiny.
Consciousness is what a certain kind of complex information-processing system does, so a sufficiently sophisticated machine could have it, and our intuitions about an inner theater mislead us.
Source: Consciousness Explained
Dennett defends a naturalistic compatibilism in which free will is a real, evolved capacity for reasons-responsive deliberation. He argues that determinism does not make us helpless or remove meaningful choice.
The kind of free will worth wanting is the ability to weigh reasons and steer our behavior, and that ability is a real feature of evolved human minds even in a deterministic world.
Source: Elbow Room
Dennett argues that free will worth wanting is compatible with a deterministic universe, since evolution produced agents able to foresee and avoid outcomes. He treats the worry about determinism as often resting on confused pictures of the self.
What matters is our evolved capacity to respond to reasons and steer our behavior, and that capacity is real even if the physical world is deterministic.
Source: Freedom Evolves
Dennett argues consciousness is a set of brain processes, a kind of 'multiple drafts' of content competing for influence. He regards the sense of a mysterious inner theater as an illusion to be explained away.
There is no central inner stage where experience comes together; what we call consciousness is distributed information processing that makes us believe in such a stage.
Source: Consciousness Explained