Rationalism
Descartes held that the mind is a thinking substance distinct from extended matter. He argued that machines, however cleverly built, could not use language flexibly or act with the general adaptability that reason shows.
A mechanism might imitate the outward behavior of animals, but it could never respond meaningfully to anything said in its presence or adapt to every circumstance the way a reasoning mind does.
Source: Discourse on the Method
Rationalism
Leibniz argued that perception cannot be explained by mechanical parts and their interactions. Enlarging a thinking machine to the size of a mill and walking inside, he said, would reveal only moving parts, never an experience.
If you wandered inside a machine built to think, you would find only pieces pushing one another, nothing that could account for a perceiving subject.
Source: Monadology
Materialism
La Mettrie defended a thoroughly materialist account of human beings, treating the body and mind as a self-winding machine. On his view, consciousness is a product of organized matter, so nothing in principle bars it from mechanical systems.
Humans are intricate machines, and thought arises from organization of matter, so the line between machine and mind is much thinner than dualists suppose.
Source: Man a Machine
Computer science
Turing proposed replacing the vague question of whether machines think with a behavioral imitation game. He anticipated objections from consciousness and argued that insisting on inner proof would equally undermine our trust in other people's minds.
If a machine can converse indistinguishably from a person, demanding extra proof of inner experience is a standard we do not apply to other humans.
Source: Computing Machinery and Intelligence
Philosophy of mind
Searle distinguishes between simulating a mind and having one. His Chinese Room argument claims that running a program manipulates symbols syntactically without understanding, though he accepts that some physical machines, like brains, cause consciousness.
Following formal rules for shuffling symbols does not by itself produce understanding, so a program alone cannot make a machine conscious, even if brain-like hardware might.
Source: Minds, Brains, and Programs
Functionalism
Dennett argues that consciousness is a set of information-processing capacities rather than a mysterious inner glow. He sees no principled barrier to artificial minds, while doubting that the intuitive picture of consciousness survives scrutiny.
Consciousness is what a certain kind of complex information-processing system does, so a sufficiently sophisticated machine could have it, and our intuitions about an inner theater mislead us.
Source: Consciousness Explained