Philosophy · Philosophy of mind

Does free will exist?

The thinkers split between those who say free will needs freedom from causal necessity (Epicurus, Sartre, in part Augustine), those who say it is compatible with causation (Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Hume, Dennett), and those who deny the ordinary notion while reinterpreting freedom (Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Kant). Theological views add the question of how human choice fits with divine power, so the answer depends on what one means by free will.

12 perspectivesClaude Sonnet 5.5Updated Oct 27, 2026A fresh run is rate limited and uses the same request limits as the rest of Perspective.

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Fault lines

Where they differ

  • Libertarian-leaning views (Epicurus, Sartre, and partly Augustine) hold that real freedom needs more than causal order; Hobbes, Hume, and Dennett hold that freedom is compatible with determinism.
  • Spinoza and Schopenhauer deny free will as uncaused or chosen willing; Sartre says consciousness is radically free and that denying it is bad faith.
  • Kant places freedom outside the causal order of appearances as a necessary practical presupposition; Hume and Dennett locate it entirely within the natural causal order.
  • Epicurus thinks indeterminism in nature is needed for agency; Spinoza, Hobbes, and Hume see no need for any break in necessity.
  • The theologians differ on how divine action relates to human acts: Aquinas says God works through secondary causes, Al-Ash'ari says God creates every act and humans acquire it, and Augustine says fallen will needs grace to choose the good.
  • Spinoza redefines freedom as acting from understanding, Sartre as groundless self-making, and Aristotle as knowing, uncompelled action shaped by habituated character.

The council

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Aristotle

384–322 BCE · Greece

Greek philosophy

Aristotle treats voluntary action as action whose origin lies in the agent who knows what they are doing. Moral responsibility follows from this, and character is built through habituated choices.

People are responsible for what they do knowingly and without compulsion, since the source of the action is within them; even our settled characters come from earlier choices we made.

Source: Nicomachean Ethics

Epicurus

341–270 BCE · Greece

Epicureanism

Epicurus accepted an atomist physics but resisted strict determinism, which he thought would undermine responsibility. His followers introduced a random atomic swerve to make room for agency.

If everything were fixed by necessity, praise and blame would make no sense, so nature must leave some room for events that are not wholly predetermined.

Source: Letter to Menoeceus

Augustine of Hippo

North Africa

Christian theology

Augustine argued that the will is free in choosing, and that evil comes from its misuse rather than from God. Later he emphasized that fallen human will needs divine grace to choose the good.

We genuinely will our own actions, and sin is our responsibility, yet after the Fall the will cannot turn toward goodness without grace.

Source: On Free Choice of the Will

Thomas Aquinas

1225–1274 · Italy

Scholasticism

Aquinas held that humans act through reason and will, choosing among goods presented by the intellect. He saw divine providence and human freedom as compatible because God works through secondary causes.

Because we can deliberate about different goods, our choices are our own, and God's governance operates through rather than against our freedom.

Source: Summa Theologiae

Islamic theology (Ash'arism)

Al-Ash'ari sought a middle path between the Mu'tazilites, who stressed human autonomy, and strict fatalists. His doctrine of acquisition holds that God creates acts while humans 'acquire' them, which grounds responsibility.

God creates every act, but the human being appropriates it through acquisition, and this is what makes the person accountable.

Source: Kitab al-Luma

Classical compatibilism

Hobbes defined liberty as the absence of external impediments to action. On this view, a fully caused action can still be free if the agent is not obstructed or coerced.

Being free means nothing stops you from doing what you want; that your wants have causes does not remove your liberty.

Source: Leviathan

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