Chalmers argues that a simulated world would be fully real, not an illusion. Simulation is a hypothesis about the underlying nature of reality, not a claim that nothing exists.
If we are simulated, tables and stars still exist; they are just made of digital processes, so the hypothesis changes metaphysics without destroying reality.
Source: Reality+: Virtual Worlds and the Problems of Philosophy
Chalmers holds that explaining behavior leaves the hard problem of experience untouched. Nevertheless, he defends the view that consciousness depends on functional organization, so silicon systems with the right structure could be conscious.
What matters for experience is the pattern of organization, not the material, so a properly organized artificial system could plausibly be conscious even though explaining why remains hard.
Source: The Conscious Mind
Chalmers distinguishes easy problems of explaining cognitive functions from the hard problem of why physical processing is accompanied by experience. He argues that physical explanation leaves this gap open, so consciousness may be a fundamental feature.
Even a complete account of brain function would not tell us why there is something it is like to be conscious, suggesting mind is not fully reducible to brain.
Source: The Conscious Mind
Chalmers distinguishes the easy problems of explaining cognitive functions from the hard problem of why any of it is accompanied by experience. He is open to treating experience as fundamental.
Explaining how the brain processes information does not by itself explain why there is subjective experience, so consciousness may need to be a basic feature of reality.
Source: The Conscious Mind