Parfit defended the view that there are irreducibly normative truths, as objective as mathematical ones, and argued that major ethical theories converge on them.
Some things matter in a way that does not depend on our attitudes, and careful reasoning can reveal these truths much as it does in mathematics.
Source: On What Matters
Parfit argued that personal identity is not what matters; psychological continuity and connectedness are. This reframes death as less deep a loss than it seems.
If a person is just a chain of connected mental states, then death is the end of that chain, and it should trouble us less than the idea of a vanishing self suggests.
Source: Reasons and Persons
Parfit argues that personal identity is not what matters; what matters is psychological continuity and connectedness, which come in degrees. Through thought experiments he defends a reductionist view with no deep further fact about the self.
There is no extra fact of being the same person over and above physical and psychological relations, and accepting this can loosen fear of death and self-concern.
Source: Reasons and Persons
Parfit defended a reductionist view in which identity consists in psychological connectedness and continuity, with no further deep fact. He argued that identity is not what matters in survival; the relations of continuity are.
There is no extra fact beyond overlapping chains of memory, character, and intention, and what should matter to us is that continuity, not strict identity.
Source: Reasons and Persons
Parfit treated the question as possibly the deepest one and explored the idea of a Selector or of a cosmic coincidence that makes some reality non-arbitrary. He also considered that the universe might be brute and inexplicable, a possibility he found hard to rule out.
Perhaps the universe is of a kind that is either explained by some simple selecting principle or simply has no explanation, and we cannot yet say which.
Source: Why Anything? Why This?